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1. Introduction 
 
What is the Way (dào 道) by which to guide social and personal life? In classical 
Chinese philosophy—the thought of the Warring States period (481–221 B.C.)—a 
prominent answer, endorsed by the Ruists (“Confucians”) and Mohists, was that the 
Way is the path of benevolence (rén 仁) and righteousness (yì 義). Broadly, 
‘benevolence’ here refers to conduct demonstrating kindness or goodwill toward 
others and to the character trait of being reliably disposed to engage in such conduct. 
‘Righteousness’ refers to what is morally right or appropriate. Early Chinese texts 
often pair these two cardinal values as a compound, ‘benevolence-and-
righteousness’ (rén yì). Jointly, they overlap extensively with what we call ‘morality’. 
Just as commonsense moral discourse today encourages us to be a good person, do 
the right thing, and avoid immoral conduct, for many classical Chinese audiences it 
would have seemed common sense that one should seek to embody benevolence 
and to do what is righteous.   
In this context, consider the following exchange from the classical Daoist 
anthology Zhuangzi (莊子). Yi’erzi was a pupil of Yao, an ancient sage-king exalted in 
both the Ruist and Mohist traditions. Xu You was a Daoist worthy—Yao’s teacher, 
according to one passage—who rejected Yao’s offer to rule the empire on the 
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grounds that the empire was in good order already and accepting merely for the title 
would be foolish. 
 
Yi’erzi said, ‘Yao told me, “You must devote yourself to benevolence and 
righteousness while clearly stating what is right and wrong’’’. Xu You said, 
‘Why come to see me? Yao having already tattooed you with benevolence and 
righteousness and cut off your nose with right and wrong, how will you 
wander the aimless and wild, unbound and uninhibited, turning and shifting 
path? …The blind lack the means to appreciate the attractiveness of eyes and 
facial expressions, the sightless lack the means to appreciate the look of richly 
coloured embroidery’.1 (6/83–86) 
 
Xu You likens devoting oneself to benevolence and righteousness and seeking to 
clearly articulate right from wrong to suffering the ancient Chinese corporal 
punishments of tattooing the convict’s face and amputating the nose. Commonsense 
morality is not merely a mistake, the passage implies. It mutilates us, leaving us 
blind to the features by which to navigate the Way. For the Way is no straight and 
narrow path, something we can commit to in advance and articulate as a definite 
scheme of distinctions. It has no fixed destination or boundaries but is instead 
constantly turning and shifting. It is a path we ‘wander’ rather than march along 
purposefully. To wander it adeptly, we rely not on clear statements of right and 
wrong, but on capacities more like those by which we appreciate beauty. 
This astonishing rejection not just of a particular understanding of morality 
but of the very idea of morality as a guide to action is representative of an intriguing 
thread of discourse that winds through the two major classical Daoist anthologies, 
the Daodejing and Zhuangzi, along with Daoist-inspired passages in the rulership 
manual The Annals of Lü Buwei and the Han dynasty compendium Huainanzi. This 
discourse is not associated with a particular author—its strands appear in different 
ancient compilations and through various strata of the Zhuangzi associated with 
 3 
distinct, anonymous authorial voices. Moreover, it includes passages presenting a 
range of slightly different doctrinal stances—some, but not all, for instance, make 
normative appeals to a conception of people’s inherent ‘nature’ or ‘disposition’ (xìng 
性). Still, the various passages are tied together by a central, unifying motif: a 
rejection of the core moral values of benevolence and righteousness as a conception 
or elucidation of the Way—not just a rejection of particular substantive theories of 
benevolence and righteousness, but of the whole idea that the Way is justifiably 
interpreted in terms of such values. To the contrary, according to this discourse, 
benevolence and righteousness actually obscure the Way and impair our ability to 
follow it. To justify this stance, the texts raise several themes—some implicit in the 
passage above—that together constitute a fascinating critique of morality.  
This chapter aims to elucidate key features of this critique, explain their 
significance in the context of early Chinese ethics, and relate them to ethical 
discourse today. Because the relevant texts are brief, of unknown authorship, and 
scattered across different bodies of writing, I will not attempt to reconstruct the 
position of any particular text or thinker. Instead, I will interpret selected individual 
passages and collate their shared themes into a composite stance that could have 
been held by a hypothetical classical Daoist thinker but may not represent the views 
of any actual historical figure. The resulting stance is thus not purely an 
interpretation of the sources but a development of them that could plausibly have 
been endorsed by their authors—or so I argue. For brevity, I will not attempt an 
exhaustive survey of relevant passages in early Chinese texts but will attempt only 
to identify several recurring themes. 
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Before beginning, let me distinguish my subject from a related but separate 
line of thought in Daoist texts. Prominent parts of the Zhuangzi, such as ‘Discourse 
on Evening Things Out’ (book 2) and ‘Autumn Waters’ (book 17), present a 
sophisticated sceptical discussion of the claim that any value or guide to action could 
be justified universally or absolutely, rather than at most only provisionally and 
contextually (see Fraser 2009). This discussion can be marshalled to formulate a 
critique of benevolence and righteousness that complements and reinforces the 
discourse treated here. However, this broader critique of value falls outside the 
scope of this chapter. Here I will focus specifically on passages that explicitly 
address the paired norms of benevolence and righteousness, typically by mentioning 
them as a compound (‘ren yi’). This is one reason for the indefinite article in my title. 
The chapter seeks to articulate just one of several potential Daoist critiques of 
morality.    
The next section gives an overview of this Daoist critique of benevolence and 
righteousness by discussing two rich dialogues from the Zhuangzi that present 
several of its key themes. Section 3 then draws on a variety of texts to develop four 
of these themes, the claims that attending to benevolence and righteousness is a sign 
of pathology, that these values interfere with people’s spontaneous capacities, that 
they are redundant, and that they are an obstacle to genuinely adroit action. In 
Section 4, I draw on these four points to construct and elucidate a composite account 
of the critique of benevolence and righteousness. I explain how, given early Daoists’ 
understanding of the structure of action and of the factors that guide it, their critique 
may be surprisingly plausible. In Section 5, I argue that the texts’ criticisms of the 
values of benevolence and righteousness can be interpreted as criticisms of morality 
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in general, both as a decision procedure and as a source of justification. Along the 
way, I attempt briefly to situate the Daoist critique in relation to well-known 
‘morality critics’ in the West, including contemporary writers such as Nagel (1979), 
Wolf (1982), and Williams (1985) and nineteenth-century figures such as Nietzsche 
and James. Section 6 concludes the chapter by considering a series of potential 
objections to the Daoist position and tentatively suggesting how a Daoist proponent 
might respond.  
 
2. ‘Apply Your Virtuosity and Follow the Way’ 
 
Some of the richest expressions of the Daoist critique of benevolence and 
righteousness occur in a series of fictional dialogues between Kongzi (Confucius) 
and Lao Dan (Laozi) scattered across several books of the Zhuangzi. Kongzi presents 
and Lao Dan critiques the view that benevolence and righteousness are the Way. In 
one dialogue, Kongzi launches into a long-winded exposition of the classics in an 
attempt to win Lao Dan’s assistance in placing books in the Zhou palace archive. Lao 
Dan interrupts and asks to hear just the crux of it.  
 
Kongzi said, ‘The crux lies in benevolence and righteousness’.  
Lao Dan said, ‘May I ask, benevolence and righteousness, are these 
people’s nature (xing)?’ 
Kongzi said, ‘They are. If the gentleman is not benevolent, he is not 
complete; if not righteous, he does not live. Benevolence and righteousness 
are genuinely people’s nature. What more is there to do?’  
Lao Dan said, ‘May I ask, what do you call benevolence and 
righteousness?’ 
Kongzi said, ‘The heart within feeling harmony and joy, caring inclusively 
for all impartially—this is what benevolence and righteousness really are’. 
Lao Dan said, ‘Eeek! There’s a danger in that last statement. All-inclusive 
care—isn’t that impractical? Impartiality to all is just partiality. Do you wish 
to keep all under heaven from losing what nurtures them? If so, then heaven 
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and earth inherently have regularity, the sun and moon inherently have 
illumination, the stars and planets inherently have ranks, the birds and beasts 
inherently have flocks, and the trees inherently grow upright. Just proceed by 
applying your virtuosity, move by following the Way, and you’ve got it! Why 
all this hustle and bustle to promote benevolence and righteousness, as 
though beating a drum in search of a lost child? Eeek! You disorder people’s 
nature’. (13/47–53) 
 
Lao Dan presents three criticisms of benevolence and righteousness and 
proposes a constructive alternative. First, the ideals of benevolence and 
righteousness are vague and impractical and perhaps conceptually self-defeating. 
Caring all-inclusively about everyone is an obscure, unworkable ideal. (What exactly 
is it? How could we act on it in practice? What would distinguish it from, for 
instance, just seeking to get along with others harmoniously?) Insofar as a 
commitment to impartiality reflects one’s personal ethical convictions, it is itself 
‘partial’ or ‘biased’, according to the text. Second, pursuing benevolence and 
righteousness is wasteful and ineffective—it results in misdirected effort and 
needless commotion, as if we were to march around banging a drum to attract a lost 
child who is in fact only playing quietly in the garden. Third, through this 
misguided effort, devotion to benevolence and righteousness disrupts people’s 
inherent nature (xing). This is a further, practical respect in which benevolence and 
righteousness may be self-defeating. Presumably they are proposed to help ‘nurture’ 
people or see to their needs. Instead, according to the text, they disorder people’s 
nature—their inherent dispositions and patterns of activity—and thus actually 
impede their ‘nurture’.  
Lao Dan’s alternative approach also turns on an appeal to natural, 
spontaneous patterns and tendencies. In early Chinese thought, human conduct is 
conceptualized as a direction and manner of ‘proceeding’ (xíng 行, also ‘walking’) 
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along some ‘course’ or ‘way’ (dao). Lao Dan observes that the natural world 
spontaneously manifests inherent courses or ways: the days, months, and seasons 
follow regular cycles, the stars and constellations track repeated paths across the sky, 
animals flock together as typical for each species, trees grow toward the light. The 
implication is that if we wish to preserve what ‘nurtures’ us, such naturally 
occurring patterns present an appropriate Way for us too to follow, one requiring no 
superfluous ‘hustle and bustle’. By our inherent nature or dispositions, we are able 
to act on patterns appropriate for us. Instead of fixing benevolence and 
righteousness as guidelines, we need only apply our inherent ‘virtuosity’ (dé 德), 
through which we can find a spontaneously occurring Way in any situation. 
‘Virtuosity’ refers to the nature-given potency, power, capacity, or proficiency by 
which we follow the Way. We can think of it as a distinctively Daoist conception of 
our capacity for agency, understood specifically as an inherent competence in 
navigating paths presented by our circumstances.  
In another episode—perhaps a variant of the same story—Kongzi calls on Lao 
Dan and expounds on benevolence and righteousness. Lao Dan replies with this 
critique: 
 
When chaff from winnowing blinds the eyes, heaven and earth and the four 
directions change places; when mosquitoes or horseflies sting the skin, the 
whole night you can’t get to sleep. When benevolence and righteousness 
confusedly torment our hearts, no disorder is greater. To keep the world from 
losing its simplicity, just move as the wind pushes you and take your stand in 
the culmination of your virtuosity. Why all this hullabaloo, like one who 
shoulders and bangs a drum to search for a lost child? The snow goose stays 
white without a daily bath; the crow stays black without a daily inking. The 
simplicity of black and white isn’t enough to debate over; the spectacle of 
fame and praise isn’t enough to count as great. When the spring dries up, the 
fish dwell together with each other on land, spitting moisture on each other 
and dampening each other with the froth, but it would be far better for them 
to forget each other in rivers and lakes. (14/56–60) 
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Again, Lao Dan presents a negative critique and a positive alternative. 
Benevolence and righteousness disorder the normal functioning of our heart, the 
organ that guides action. They disorient us, as does a blinding cloud of dust, and 
interfere with what normally comes spontaneously, as a painful insect bite prevents 
us from falling asleep. They amount to much unnecessary, ineffectual effort and fuss. 
Again, the constructive recommendation is that we employ our inherent virtuosity 
to find paths to take in particular situations, adapting to our context much as a 
sailboat’s path is determined by the direction of the wind. Following the Way should 
be simple and easy, as the goose’s feathers stay white without bathing. The passage 
presents a pivotal cluster of metaphors for the role of benevolence and righteousness 
and the character of a flourishing social life—metaphors also prominent elsewhere in 
the Zhuangzi (6/22–24, 6/72–73). A community devoted to benevolence and 
righteousness is like a stranded school of fish struggling to survive by spewing froth 
on each other. By analogy, benevolence and righteousness are a desperate, futile 
response to pathological circumstances. Urgently tending to each other’s survival 
might seem a fitting course of action for the grounded fish. But ideally they could 
find their way back to a water source—a spring that hasn’t run dry—and simply 
swim along together spontaneously, without deliberately attending to each other. 
 
3. Core Themes 
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The two selections above raise many of the major themes running through Daoist 
writings critical of benevolence and righteousness. This section will expand on 
several of these themes, which are deeply intertwined with one another.  
As the metaphors of the beached fish and the mutilating punishments imply, 
reliance on benevolence and righteousness is typically depicted as a sign of personal 
and social pathology (Moeller 2009: 43, Ci 2011: 236). A concern with benevolence 
and righteousness signals loss of or alienation from the Way and disruption or 
crippling of our virtuosity, or powers of agency. Such moral values arise only when 
people have failed to apply their virtuosity to follow the Way and interact with each 
other adeptly. The Daodejing, for instance, claims that ‘When the great Way is 
discarded, there are benevolence and righteousness.…When the six relations are not 
harmonious, there are filial devotion and parental kindness’ (Lau 1963: 22). One of 
the Zhuangzi ‘Primitivist’ writings—so dubbed by Graham (1981) because they 
advocate a simple, primitive agricultural lifestyle—asks, ‘If the Way and virtuosity 
are not discarded, why choose benevolence and righteousness?’ (9/11). The 
Huainanzi states: 
 
Proceeding by following our nature (xing) is called the ‘Way’. Fulfilling one’s 
inborn nature is called ‘virtuosity’. Only when our nature is lost is 
benevolence valued; only when the Way is lost is righteousness valued. Thus 
when benevolence and righteousness are established, the Way and virtuosity 
are displaced. (Major et al. 2010: 397)  
 
Benevolence and righteousness arise through attempts to remedy deficiencies in 
social interaction that would not occur, or would be resolved spontaneously, were 
we applying our virtuosity and following the Way competently. They are not the 
Way, but crutches or aids introduced when it is lost. Precisely because they are 
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crutches, as long as we rely on them, we thereby prevent ourselves from following 
the Way adeptly (Ci 2011: 237). Interpreting the Way through these values amounts 
to handicapping ourselves, as if we were to require that people with healthy legs 
walk with a cane. The relation between these values and the Way explains 
apparently paradoxical passages in Daoist texts urging that other ethical ideals can 
be realized only by renouncing benevolence and righteousness. As the Daodejing 
says, ‘Cut off benevolence and cast off righteousness and the people will return to 
filial devotion and parental kindness’ (Lau 1963: 23). A prerequisite for following the 
Way is that we transcend benevolence and righteousness.    
A related theme is that benevolence and righteousness interfere with our 
inherent nature (xing) or our spontaneous functioning. The Yi’erzi passage implies 
that benevolence and righteousness damage our innate faculties. Another passage 
depicts Zhuangzi claiming that, in striving to exemplify benevolence and 
righteousness, people only suppress their inherent virtuosity (14/12). Lao Dan states 
that benevolence and righteousness disorder our nature. A Primitivist essay claims 
that benevolence and righteousness ‘disrupt all the world’ and those who pursue 
them ‘trade away their nature for benevolence and righteousness’ (8/19). In some 
Primitivist writings, people’s nature is associated with a specific normative 
conception of a simple, agricultural lifestyle (9/7), analogous to how the ‘genuine 
nature’ of horses fixes a way of life for them, running about the plains and eating 
grass (9/1). Other passages—such as the Huainanzi excerpt above—do not tie 
people’s nature to a particular lifestyle but imply only that we should pursue a Way 
that fulfills our nature, presumably in the sense of nurturing our health and 
exercising our innate functioning. Another Huainanzi passage relates our nature to 
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our virtuosity, a link affirmed in many passages: ‘the Way is what guides things; 
virtuosity is what maintains our nature.…When virtuosity declines, benevolence and 
righteousness arise’ (Major et al. 2010: 351). The implication seems to be that the 
healthy exercise of virtuosity supports the flourishing of our nature. One Zhuangzi 
passage states that virtuosity is that by which things live, while nature refers to 
norms associated with having a particular living body (12/38–39), suggesting a 
conception of ‘nature’ as normal, healthy physiological functioning. 
With the exception of some radical Primitivist passages, I suggest that these 
appeals to people’s nature do not imply the implausible stance that our inborn, 
biological nature inherently programs us with a specific Way to follow, which 
benevolence and righteousness disrupt. More likely, the point is that our nature 
furnishes us with capacities by which certain patterns of action come to us easily and 
spontaneously, without intensive study or effort, and that such patterns are 
characteristic of good health and the flourishing use of our capacities. By analogy, 
we might say it is people’s nature to walk upright or to speak a language, or it is the 
nature of fish to live in water. The allegation then is that benevolence and 
righteousness interfere with the spontaneous, healthy functioning of our capacities.   
A further, complementary theme is that the guidance available from more 
basic sources renders benevolence and righteousness redundant (cf. Moeller 2009: 
43–52). Such sources include our nature, virtuosity, and the openings for action—the 
Way—presented by concrete contexts. Lao Dan urges that we simply rely on our 
inherent virtuosity and move according to the Way. The Yi’erzi story depicts the 
activity of Xu You’s ‘teacher’—perhaps the Way itself—as harmonizing the myriad 
things ‘without deeming this righteousness’ and benefiting a myriad generations 
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‘without deeming this benevolent’ (6/88–89). An implication is that action that 
issues directly from virtuosity in response to the Way fulfils the ends of benevolence 
and righteousness without the agent intending to do so. A passage in the The Annals 
of Lü Buwei makes this point explicit with respect to our nature: if we master the 
genuine features of our nature and fate, the text claims, ‘the art of benevolence and 
righteousness proceeds of itself’ (Knoblock and Riegel 2000: sect. 25/3.4). The 
Huainanzi explains that ‘benevolence and righteousness cannot be greater than the 
Way and virtuosity; benevolence and righteousness lie within the embrace of the 
Way and virtuosity’ (Major et al. 2010: 641). Guiding action by the Way and 
virtuosity is also supposedly simpler and more direct than appealing to benevolence 
and righteousness, requiring no hullabaloo and offering no grounds for debate. For 
among the problems in acting on benevolence and righteousness is that different 
agents and circumstances are so diverse and complex that ‘the bases of benevolence 
and righteousness and the paths of right and wrong are a tangled-up, confused 
jumble’ (Zhuangzi 2/70)—so much so that distinguishing general or absolute values 
to guide action is impracticable.  
A final recurring theme is that benevolence and righteousness are antithetical 
to ‘forgetting’, a signal feature of adroit action in Zhuangist thought. In many 
Zhuangzi passages, exemplary action is characterized by the absence of conscious 
attention that ensues when things fit well, as when we ‘forget’ a perfectly fitting belt 
or shoes (see Fraser 2014). A well-known passage about personal improvement 
depicts ‘forgetting benevolence and righteousness’ as the first stage in becoming a 
Zhuangist adept (6/90). Benevolence and righteousness force us to attend to our 
interactions with others, when ideally we would aim to ‘forget the entire world’ 
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while making ‘the entire world forget us’ (14/10–11). The metaphor of the stranded 
fish implies that the finest mode of social interaction would be one in which we 
‘forget each other’, our relations with others proceeding so smoothly that both sides 
cease to consciously attend to how they interact. The richest treatment of the 
metaphor presents it as a couplet: ‘Fish forget each other in rivers and lakes, people 
forget each other in arts of the Way’ (6/73). The ideal is not mutual neglect but for 
our joint, skillful performance of the Way to fit both sides so well that we seemingly 
act as extensions of each other, as the well-fitting shoes become an extension of our 
body or a pair of figure skaters spontaneously coordinate their movements. 
Suppose, for the sake of discussion, that naturally occurring patterns can 
indeed guide action and that we possess an inherent virtuosity by which to navigate 
an adroit path through them. Why then have benevolence and righteousness become 
the prevailing conception of appropriate conduct? As Lao Dan explains in yet 
another Zhuangzi dialogue with Kongzi, benevolence and righteousness were never 
intended to be absolute or universal norms, but only temporary expedients. They 
were never more than makeshift ‘grass huts’ in which one camps for a night. For ‘the 
perfected people of old’, benevolence was ‘a makeshift way’ and righteousness ‘a 
temporary lodging’ from which they went on ‘to wander in the meandering 
emptiness’, aiming at no particular destination (14/50–52). Taking benevolence and 
righteousness as fixed norms is a misguided extrapolation of guidance offered for 
particular circumstances that no longer obtain. The more fitting approach is to 
‘connect with the Way, unite with our virtuosity, and put aside benevolence and 
righteousness’ (13/64). The aim is to find what fits the situation, in response to the 
needs of those involved, without relying on predetermined standards. As another 
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passage puts it, what is actually yi (‘righteous’)—in this case, right or appropriate—
is ‘set by what fits’ in a particular context (18/39). The norms of benevolence and 
righteousness are like the Six Classics, which are merely ‘the worn tracks of the 
former kings’, not the shoes that made the tracks (14/77). Neither the classics nor 
benevolence and righteousness offer reliable guidance, because the Way is a process 
of ongoing transformation—one must ‘conduct oneself as a person in relation to the 
process of transformation’ (14/81). 
 
4. Rejecting Benevolence and Righteousness 
 
Drawing these themes together, we can summarize the Daoist critique of 
benevolence and righteousness roughly as follows. Benevolence and righteousness 
are not the Way nor an adequate, practicable guide to it. Committing to them 
generates misplaced, fruitless effort, which directs us away from simpler, more 
effective paths that better suit our nature and our situation. Adopting benevolence 
and righteousness as guides to or norms of conduct interferes with applying our 
inherent capacities to find and follow the most fitting course of action. Instead, we 
can employ our inherent virtuosity—our ability to respond adeptly to the shape of 
our circumstances—to find a Way to proceed in concrete contexts. Our 
circumstances as we find them—including our own abilities and dispositions—
always present us with various paths of more or less adaptive, harmonious, and 
efficacious action.   
This critical stance is rooted in and rendered plausible by a particular 
understanding of the structure of action and of the Way. Daoist thinkers conceive of 
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action through the model of skills. Normatively commendable action for them is an 
adroit response to particular concrete circumstances akin to the competent 
performance of an art or a skill, such as riding a bicycle or just walking down the 
street. To them, it is plausible, even obvious, that competent conduct rests primarily 
on an implicit, uncodifiable feel for and responsiveness to one’s situation. For it is a 
truism that skilled performances issue from such a feel and responsiveness. This 
view of action dovetails with the Daoists’ conception of the Way. For many early 
Chinese thinkers, the Way can be thought of as a set of norms covering our course 
and manner of conduct—what we do and how we do it. Mohist and Ruist thinkers 
sought to identify the Way with norms that are ‘constant’ or ‘regular’ (chang 常)—
that is, settled and consistent. By contrast, Daoist texts typically depict the Way as 
continually shifting and transforming, following no fixed or predetermined 
boundaries.2 There is no ‘constant’ Way—in particular, benevolence and 
righteousness do not constitute, demarcate, or guide toward such a Way. For Daoist 
critics, the Way simply is not the sort of thing that can be articulated through fixed 
norms or values such as benevolence and righteousness. The question ‘What is the 
Way?’ has no determinate general answer, let alone one as specific as ‘The Way is 
what is benevolent and righteous’.3 All we can offer are vague, loose generalizations 
such as ‘proceed according to the facts of the situation’ (4/43) or ‘rely on natural 
patterns, slice through the main gaps, and be guided by the major seams, responding 
to what’s inherently so’ (3/6–7). 
If these Daoist thinkers’ exemplars of competent action are so-called ‘open’ 
skills such as walking or bicycle riding, their view of the Way is easy to understand. 
Open skills contrast with ‘closed’ skills, in which the performance of the skill is the 
 16 
same every time (Vigani and Heaton 2010: 8). An example of a closed skill might be 
drawing a circle on a fresh sheet of paper with a sharp pencil. The task and the 
conditions are always identical. By contrast, the Way by which we perform open 
skills is indeterminate and subject to constant change. When we walk or ride down 
the street, we must adjust to different gradients and surfaces and steer our way 
through traffic. Adept performance of open skills depends on a tacit feel for and 
ability to adjust to changing conditions. The same point holds for many of the skills 
explored in Zhuangzi passages—carving up an ox, crafting a wheel, whitewater 
swimming, and piloting a ferry are just a few examples.  
The crux of the Daoist critique can be helpfully illuminated by applying the 
notion of an open skill to think through the characterization of benevolence and 
righteousness as ‘a makeshift way’ and ‘a temporary lodging’—tactics employed by 
ancient sages in a one-off, concrete situation. Let’s say I have fallen into a bad habit 
that impairs my performance in a skill. Suppose, for instance, that when skiing I sit 
back too much, making it difficult to change edges and turn smoothly (cf. Vigani and 
Heaton 2010: 21–29). A ski instructor might tell me to move my hips forward over 
my feet, keep my hands more forward, or press down on the balls of my feet. Any of 
these tips could help nudge me out of my bad habit, but none of them is the Way. 
The Way in this case is to maintain dynamic fore-aft balance while gliding down 
slopes of different shapes and gradients in different snow conditions. There is no 
determinate or fixed technique for such balancing, and the exact movements 
involved change continually. Moreover, being in balance is not a specific posture. It 
is a relation between the parts of my body and the environment, indicated by how 
my body feels and what I am able to do next. Any tips that prompt me to balance 
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better are at best only temporary aids, to be set aside once the problem is solved. 
Taking them as ‘constant’ guides would indeed cripple my ability to follow the Way. 
After all, the point is to stay in balance, not keep my hands forward, move my hips 
over my feet, or anything else. Focusing too much on hand, hip, or foot position will 
not teach me proper balance and indeed might disrupt my balance in other respects.    
Benevolence and righteousness, then, are analogous to the coaching tips a 
sports, music, or dance instructor might offer a particular pupil committing a 
particular fault in a particular context. In their original setting, they may have been 
effective hints for finding the Way. But they must not be mistaken for the Way itself, 
and treating them as anything more than a provisional expedient interferes with our 
mastering the Way.  
 
5. Rejecting Morality 
 
The Daoist critique is directed at benevolence and righteousness (ren yi), but I 
suggest it extrapolates to a critique of morality more generally. While the Chinese 
concept of ‘ren yi’ may not be equivalent to our concept of morality, the two share 
enough features that we can defensibly read Daoist texts as offering a critique of 
morality—or at least something similar enough to be worth discussing alongside the 
views of Western critics of morality, such as Nietzsche. Of course, even in 
contemporary academic philosophy, ‘morality’ is not a monolithic concept. A 
Kantian conception of morality may diverge from a consequentialist conception, for 
instance. Still, we can identify key features typically associated with philosophical, 
normative conceptions of morality. Morality supposedly applies universally: moral 
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norms transcend those of particular cultures or communities and apply to all 
persons with the capacity to follow them. It overrides other values, norms, and 
practices: conduct that is morally prohibited must be avoided, even if it complies 
with self-interest, law, or local custom. It incorporates some conception of 
impartiality or impartial justification. It supposedly takes up a central, fundamental 
place in life, partly because of how it overrides other values.   
Ruist and Mohist statements about benevolence and righteousness associate 
them with similar features. In the Confucian Analects, benevolence and 
righteousness are central to the life of the gentleman, the text’s ethical ideal. The 
gentleman places righteousness above all other considerations (17:23, 7:16).4 He 
‘dwells’ in benevolence, never violating it ‘even for the space of a meal’ and 
adhering to it even in moments of urgency (4:1, 4:5). He would not relinquish it even 
to save his life (15:9). Benevolence and righteousness are both tied to conceptions of 
impartiality. The benevolent person models his treatment of others on how he 
prefers to be treated (6:30). The gentleman is inherently neither for nor against 
anything, but only ‘sides with what he deems righteous’ (4:10). The Mohists too 
depict righteousness as the most valuable thing in the world—more valuable even 
than one’s person, since people will fight to the death over it (47/1–2).5 They seem 
to endorse organizing one’s life entirely around benevolence and righteousness 
(47/20). They propose their divinity, Heaven, as a model of righteousness (27/73) 
partly on the grounds that it is impartial to all (4/9–10). The norms of benevolence 
and righteousness apply to everyone, since we are all Heaven’s subjects. The Mozi 
explicitly contrasts ‘the Way of benevolence and righteousness’ with mere ‘practices’ 
and ‘customs’ and indicates that benevolence and righteousness override such 
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parochial norms (25/74–81). Both Mohist and Ruist writings thus imply that 
benevolence and righteousness take priority over other values or norms, reflect some 
rough conception of impartiality, and play a central, fundamental role in the life of 
the admirable person. I suggest, then, that the classical Chinese concepts of 
benevolence and righteousness overlap enough with morality that we can 
reasonably consider the Daoist critique of benevolence and righteousness a critique 
of morality.  
What then is the significance of the Daoist critique? Unlike some 
contemporary critiques of mainstream moral theories, such as Stocker (1976), it is not 
a criticism of any particular substantive moral theory. Its point is not that prevailing 
normative theories are inadequate and a more satisfactory moral theory must be 
sought. Nor is it the view, pioneered by James (1896), that morality can never be 
formulated into a final theory, since it is constantly evolving in response to new, 
emerging demands. Contemporary critics of prevailing moral theories, such as Nagel 
(1979), Williams (1985), and Larmore (1987), have argued that morality cannot be 
codified or is not the proper subject of a systematic theory, because value cannot be 
reduced to a single source, for instance, or because moral questions cannot be 
satisfactorily resolved through an explicit decision procedure. Critics such as 
Williams (1981, 1985) and Wolf (1982) have contended that morality is but one kind 
of value among others and does not necessarily subsume or override other values. 
Although Daoist thinkers might agree with some of these claims, the gist of their 
critique diverges from them. As Leiter notes (1997: 252), these recent criticisms of 
morality are all directed at particular theories of morality, not at morality itself. The 
Daoist critique is distinct from all of them in two ways. First, it focuses not on moral 
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theory but on morality as a practice and the associated attitude or ideology that 
morality is the Way. Second, it does not advocate a different understanding of, role 
for, or approach to morality. Rather, it advocates that morality be jettisoned entirely, 
on the grounds that its practice and the associated ideology are detrimental to the 
exercise of our virtuosity and our following the Way—and thus to ‘nurturing life’, or 
living as well as we can. The point is not that one or another theory of morality is 
problematic but that the practice of guiding and evaluating human conduct by any 
conception of morality is crippling. The Daoist critique thus aligns with Nietzsche in 
rejecting morality as a cultural practice on the grounds of its pernicious effects on 
human flourishing (Leiter 1997: 274). It departs from Nietzsche in holding that 
morality detrimentally affects everyone, not only an exceptional handful of creative 
geniuses. It urges that we would all benefit, as individuals and communities, by 
forgetting about morality.   
As their texts make clear, in rejecting morality, the Daoists are not rejecting 
typical practical ends of morality such as personal well-being and consideration for 
others. (If anything, they advocate greater responsiveness to others than most moral 
theories do.) They are rejecting appeals to morality as a source of action guidance—
and thus as a decision procedure—and as a criterion of appropriate action—and thus 
as a basis for justification. In rejecting morality as a decision procedure, they 
advocate that we not guide action by deliberately attempting to follow moral norms. 
Instead, we are to seek the most responsive, fitting, effective, or harmonious way 
forward, given our concrete circumstances. Ideally, we need not even ask what that 
way is but can directly act appropriately. In more recalcitrant situations, the decision 
procedure envisioned seems to be simply to puzzle out the most fitting, sustainable 
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course of action, given our values, needs, and abilities and the circumstances we 
face, including the demands and needs of others. We are able to work our way 
through such situations because of our inherent virtuosity, which amounts to an 
inborn aptitude for ‘arts of the Way’—roughly, for responding to action-guiding 
structures and patterns by acquiring and extending skills. Even when we apply 
moral norms to guide action, it is by virtue of this underlying aptitude or virtuosity 
that we are able to do so. The Daoist stance is that we can most effectively guide 
action directly through this aptitude, rather than through the intermediary of moral 
norms.  
Rejecting morality as a decision procedure does not amount to rejecting 
morality entirely. One can consistently renounce moral values or principles as a 
decision procedure while nevertheless endorsing morality as a criterion by which to 
evaluate or justify conduct. For what is truly distinctive of morality is its claim to a 
special normative status grounded in universal or impartial standards. However, I 
suggest that Daoist critics probably also reject appeals to morality as an evaluation or 
a justification. When Yao urges Yi’erzi to devote himself to benevolence and 
righteousness and to clearly articulate right from wrong, the implication is that these 
are universal norms by which the sage-king governs the world—and thus, I suggest, 
the highest criteria by which to assess or justify conduct. When Kongzi contends that 
benevolence and righteousness are people’s genuine nature, such that without them 
a gentleman cannot really live or be complete, again the implication is probably that 
they are a universal or fundamental standard by which to evaluate or justify 
conduct. In rejecting the view that benevolence and righteousness are the Way, then, 
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the Daoists are likely also implicitly rejecting the idea that justification or evaluation 
by appeal to these moral values is privileged or authoritative.  
 My hypothesis is that the Daoists regard such justificatory or evaluative 
claims as empty, redundant, or irrelevant. They see conduct as appropriate or 
justified insofar as it responds to features of the agent’s context in a successful, 
competent way that allows all involved to proceed onward smoothly. There may be 
a plurality of ways to do this, typically none of which will be definitive. Daoist critics 
probably reject the idea of any stronger, more authoritative justification or 
evaluation beyond what tentatively seems most fitting. To them, the claim that some 
course of conduct is morally justified is empty: it adds nothing to the status of 
simply being justified, in the sense of provisionally yielding the best balance 
between relevant factors in some situation. Nor for them would the claim that some 
factor represents a moral reason give it priority in determining what that balance 
might be. Most likely, they would suggest there is no way to identify any feature—
including the general feature of being a moral reason—that determines what 
considerations will take priority in every case. If we look at the examples of adroit 
action given in the Zhuangzi—expertly butchering oxen, swimming through a stretch 
of rapids, compromising with one’s wards over food servings, nurturing a rare bird 
by providing a suitable diet and home—what makes such actions appropriate is that 
they are practically successful, according to ends set by the context. (In examples 
involving interpersonal relations, this success seems to be marked by both sides’ 
accepting and flourishing under the arrangement.) To Daoist writers, it is pointless 
to claim any stronger justification for such courses of action beyond the fact that they 
work, provisionally. Moral criticism might have a point, if it calls attention to 
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overlooked factors likely to reduce the success of some path. If we ride roughshod 
over others’ interests, for instance, we neglect important features of our context and 
undertake a course likely to generate obstacles later. The Daoist proposal is simply to 
become as responsive to such features as we can and forgo empty, potentially self-
righteous claims to authoritative justification.   
 
6. Critical Reflections 
 
Like Nietzsche’s ‘genealogy’ of morality, the Daoist critique reminds us that 
evaluation and guidance of human conduct in distinctively moral terms is a cultural 
practice, adopted under certain circumstances for certain purposes. Like the custom 
of offering libations to the Olympian gods, this practice may be neither necessary nor 
inevitable. Hence the Daoist stance deserves careful critical evaluation. A first step 
toward such an evaluation is to acknowledge that a fuller account is needed of the 
Daoist alternative to morality than I have been able to provide in this brief chapter. 
In particular, Daoist thinkers owe us a more detailed explanation of the Way and of 
normative notions such as ‘good fit’ (shì 適) or ‘competence’ (tōng 通). For the 
purposes of this chapter, however, let me set these demands aside and consider 
several more immediate potential problems facing the Daoist critique.  
One potential difficulty is that in their rhetoric about people’s nature, 
spontaneously occurring natural patterns, and our inborn virtuosity, Daoist critics of 
morality may be conflating normative with descriptive issues, in effect contending 
that whatever exists naturally is thereby appropriate or right. Primitivist passages 
that link people’s nature to specific patterns of activity—typically a plain, rustic 
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life—may indeed make this mistake. But most of the passages discussed here do not 
seem committed to this view. A more charitable interpretation of the appeals to 
people’s nature and virtuosity and to natural patterns is that our inherent 
dispositions and abilities are such that we always find ourselves following some 
Way—holding certain prima facie defensible values and norms and employing our 
ability to find a course of action from them in our particular situation. Daoists need 
not hold that these values and norms are automatically appropriate, let alone that 
they are appropriate because they are natural. Indeed, the most likely Daoist stance 
is probably that such values and norms can be expected to require extension and 
revision as circumstances change. I suggest that the focus on such spontaneous 
features pertains less to the content of the Way and more to the process by which we 
find and follow it. That is, the most fitting Way is generally a simple, straightforward 
extension or revision of our present Way discoverable by applying our spontaneous, 
inherent virtuosity.      
As their texts clearly indicate, in critiquing morality the Daoists are not 
advocating immorality, nor ‘anything goes’. Rather, they are urging more adept 
performance in applying our capacity for skilled, responsive agency to follow the 
Way. This constructive position suggests another critical question. Might the Daoist 
stance actually amount to a refined conception of morality, rather than a rejection of 
it? After all, they seem to advocate an unselfish, perceptive responsiveness to others, 
arguably a quintessentially moral attitude. Still, I suggest the Daoist approach 
cannot defensibly be interpreted as an alternative conception of morality, since it 
rejects explicit moral concepts as guides to action and makes no claim to a 
distinctively moral conception of justification. The values a Daoist adept acts on may 
 25 
sometimes overlap with values affirmed by various conceptions of morality. Some 
relevant texts explicitly claim as much, as we saw. But the unifying ideal is not 
moral; it is simply to find, for each particular situation, a fitting path by which to 
proceed, applying standards of good fit that may themselves change with 
circumstances. Any number of different paths might count as fitting in different 
situations, and there is no reason to expect that what fits will regularly correlate with 
morality.  
A further potential worry for the Daoist position is whether it can support 
social criticism and reform. One function of morality is to provide a purportedly 
universal, transcultural standard by which to underwrite criticism and amelioration 
of repugnant practices such as slavery or foot-binding. If the Daoists dispense with 
morality, do they retain any grounds from which to justify social reform? They 
themselves seem to think so, since they contend that heeding their concerns will 
improve social conditions. Of course, their criticisms of problematic conduct or 
practices will not be expressed in moral terms. But Daoist writings employ a rich 
vocabulary for expressing disapproval of inept or unsuitable conduct, which they 
denigrate as ‘confused’, ‘clumsy’, or ‘blind’, for instance. Rather than improvement 
by moral standards, they urge greater responsiveness to our circumstances, 
including others’ needs and preferences, and increased awareness of different, novel 
courses of action open to us. Indeed, by eliminating appeals to a privileged status of 
moral righteousness, the Daoist approach might present more room for 
improvement in our treatment of others than morality itself does. Morality can be 
employed as a licence for cruelty, through mistreatment of those deemed unworthy 
or neglect of those we are not morally required to help. The Daoist approach 
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prompts us to consider how to find a path that aligns with others’ skillfully, such 
that both sides can sustain their course harmoniously.     
Probably the most important challenge for the Daoist critical stance is to ask 
just what norms, values, or guidance it proposes as a replacement for morality. If 
morality is not the Way, then just what is? Daoist texts often present skilled 
performances as models for appropriate conduct. But the analogy is inexact. Skills 
come with built-in ends that determine what counts as appropriate performance. 
The butcher’s skill is measured by whether he slices cleanly through the meat, the 
whitewater swimmer’s by whether he survives the rapids unscathed. Conduct in 
general does not have such fixed ends, so perhaps the skill analogies are misleading. 
The core question that morality purports to answer is not the first-order issue of how 
to perform skills well but the second-order one of what sorts of skills we are justified 
in performing. Becoming a highly skilled perpetrator of genocide is surely not the 
Way, for instance.  
The Daoist view acknowledges these points, I suggest, but responds 
differently to the claim that conduct in general has no fixed ends. If human conduct 
has no built-in aim or direction, then there can be no fixed or predetermined Way, 
and so morality too cannot be the Way. We must relinquish the idea that any 
particular moral value, model, principle, formula, or justification procedure can 
authoritatively determine appropriate conduct. Demanding an explicit recipe for the 
Way is like demanding a recipe for maintaining your balance while climbing a rocky 
hill. The only possible ‘recipe’ is something as blandly general—indeed nearly 
tautological—as ‘keep your centre of mass over one of your feet’.  
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So how do we find the Way? I suggest the Daoist approach is to start by 
provisionally accepting the values we find ourselves with and going on from there. 
We stand ready, in light of conditions we encounter, to modify how we apply these 
values, to find tradeoffs between them, or to revise or replace them. The skill 
examples provide concrete illustrations of how we might carry out this process by 
developing greater sensitivity to our circumstances and cultivating the psychological 
calm and fluidity needed to find effective courses to pursue (see Fraser 2014). Like 
chopping up an ox or swimming through dangerous rapids, finding and following 
the Way is a practical task that mixes competent performance of the familiar with 
puzzle-solving in the face of change and novelty. The Daoist stance is that morality 
is but one particular approach to this task—a relatively ineffectual and frustrating 
one.  
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Notes 
 
1 Citations to the Zhuangzi give chapter and line numbers in Zhuangzi (1956). 
All translations from Chinese texts are my own. English-language editions are cited 
for reference only.  
2 An exception is Primitivist writings which contend that people have a 
‘constant nature’ and without interference would spontaneously form small, simple 
agrarian communities. 
3 The Daoist critique may parallel Geuss’s grounds for claiming that the 
question ‘What ought I to do?’ as framed in mainstream philosophical ethics is a 
mistake. Once we grasp ‘the nature of human action and its place in the world’, 
according to Geuss, we see that ‘there is no such appropriate answer that combines 
authority with determinateness’ (2005: 59). 
4 Citations give section numbers in Lau (1979). 
5 Citations give chapter and line numbers in Mozi (1986). 
